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Abstract
One of the most signifi cant and most widely discussed elements of the doctrine 
stipulating the protection of human creations by copyright law is the justifi cation for 
such protection, particularly when it allocates exclusive rights to the creator. The 
doctrine is principally based on economic values and does not take into account a 
philosophical perspective; instead, it considers the equilibrium between protection 
and the use of people’s work for economic purposes. In general, legal scholars are di-
vided into two groups: those who are highly protectionist and those with a more lib-
ertarian outlook who claim that what the artist receives from society and the world 
must be returned. This essay aims to introduce relevant elements of contemporary 
hermeneutics into the discussion regarding the justifi cation for copyright protection, 
advancing a thesis that has not yet been proposed within the legal community. Given 
that hermeneutics is the fairest and most effective way to search for philosophical 
truth, it would be fairer and more appropriate to incorporate contemporary herme-
neutics into copyright law when deciding on the allocation of exclusive rights.
Key words: hermeneutics, copyright, creation, exclusive rights. 
Resumo
Um dos elementos mais signifi cativos e discutidos nas análises doutrinárias referentes à 
proteção das criações humanas pelo direito de autor é a justifi cativa para tal proteção, 
em especial sob a forma de exclusividade. Os elementos trazidos à discussão pela doutri-
na inserem-se em valores econômicos e não exploram as condições fi losófi cas. Trata-se 
muito de discutir o equilíbrio na proteção e o uso das obras por razões econômicas. 
Em linhas gerais, os doutrinadores dividem-se entre alguns de tendência extremamente 
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One major issue in the fi eld of copyright2 law 
is the justifi cation for allotting exclusive legal rights to 
creators working in the arts, culture and/or science.
This basic aspect of copyright is the very founda-
tion of its existence: if a person is to be remunerated 
or rewarded for something that he has created, then 
this remuneration or reward must be justifi ed from a 
philosophical perspective.
Previously, justifi cations for such rights have been 
offered based on the equilibrium between what the cre-
ator is “given” by society (given that the world existed 
before his arrival) and what the creator can create using 
his subjective creative abilities (in essence, taking into 
account his being-in-the-world as a creator).
The creator does not create “absolutely alone” 
(because certain things were developed before his “ar-
rival”), but at the same time creative work is not simply 
ready and available for everyone to create. To translate 
what one senses into an intelligible medium requires 
subjective participation, and it is also necessary for the 
creator to evaluate his environment.
To understand the concept of protection, this 
equilibrium has been suggested to be necessary if one 
is to understand and properly apply copyright law. The 
confrontation between the individual input of the crea-
tor and what he has received from the world in devel-
oping his creation has been perhaps the most relevant 
point in discussions of copyright since its effective but 
preliminary inception as a legal category in the early 
eighteenth century.
This fundamental consideration has infl uenced 
several important aspects of copyright, including limita-
tion catalogs3 (which allow greater access to the work 
by third parties) and the protection period in which 
exclusive rights are assigned to the creator before the 
work enters the public domain and use requirements 
no longer exist.
This issue has been addressed exclusively from 
a commercial perspective4 that refers to the need for 
creative work to circulate in society or in the (often 
forcible) confrontations between liberty and the pro-
tection afforded by the typical exclusive forms of copy-
right (which suggests that the need to pay for use, for 
example, represents a violation of the right to have ac-
cess to culture)5.
Too often, confl icts exist between trade and oth-
er interests that are still solely related to commercial 
or legal aspects. These confl icts, though legitimate, give 
2 I use the term copyright to refer to all rights and powers inherent to creators and artists, with no distinction made between copyright and related rights. However, 
in the text, I will use the term droit d’auteur when necessary to make a systemic distinction between the system originally created in France, which is used in Romanist 
countries, and the system created in the United Kingdom, which is used in countries that follow the common law tradition.
3 The use of limitations and exceptions is present in national laws with the droit d’auteur system; in countries with copyright systems, its equivalent is the fair use doctrine.
4 “While a furious debate rages over copyrights and patents, there is general agreement that some protection is needed to secure for inventors and creators the fruits 
of their labors. The rhetoric that ‘information just wants to be free’ suggests that no one should be allowed to profi t from her ideas. Despite this, there does not seem 
to be a strong lobby arguing that while it is ok for the rest of us to benefi t from the fruits of our labors, inventors and creators should have to subsist on the charity 
of others. For all the emotion, it seems both sides agree that intellectual property laws need to strike a balance between providing suffi cient incentive for creation 
and the freedom to make use of existing ideas. Putting it differently, both sides agree that intellectual property rights are a ‘necessary evil’ that fosters innovation, and 
disagreement is over where the line should be drawn. For the supporters of intellectual property, current monopoly profi ts are barely enough; for its enemies currently 
monopoly profi ts are too high” (Boldrin and Levine, 2008, p. 6).
5 This confrontation has actually lowered the value of copyright law given that some aspects of criminal and civil offenses end up being ignored or underemphasized as 
illegal acts and contrario sensu valued as acceptable behavior, which undermines the coercive force of the law. In this sense, it is worth remembering what Peces Barba et 
al. argued in their work Legal Theory Course: “[...] in Law there is an interrelationship between freedom and coercion: Law can be a mechanism to ensure freedom for all, 
but the presence of coercive dimensions is imperative” (Peces Barba et al. 2000, p. 19). This is observed, for example, in the purchase of pirated products and the search 
for music and audiovisual digital fi les on the Internet. These behaviors are no longer considered grave in society, which indicates (i) that in some respects the power 
of copyright law has declined due to new legal relationships that must be rebalanced; and (ii) that this power must be reestablished by readjusting legal relationships 
through a more modern copyright law. However, libertarian or libertarianist currents should use effective, honest arguments that work from an intellectual perspective 
rather than resorting to rhetorical expressions such as information must be free or arguing that access to prior work is important for the creation of new work as if this 
implies that, as a consequence, the former needs to be free.
protecionista (considerados conservadores) e os que apresentam uma visão mais libertá-
ria, entendendo que o que o autor recebe da sociedade e do mundo deve ser devolvido. 
O autor pretende inserir na discussão sobre a justifi cativa para a proteção pelo direito 
de autor elementos da hermenêutica contemporânea, em discussão ainda não travada 
na comunidade jurídica. Do ponto de vista da proteção do autor, seria a hermenêutica o 
caminho mais justo e efetivo para a busca da verdade fi losófi ca. A atribuição de direitos 
de exclusivo por meio de argumentos de ordem fi losófi ca, seria mais justa e adequada.
Palavras-chave: hermenêutica, direito de autor, criação, direitos exclusivos.
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a “bath of philosophy” (to quote Streck) to only those 
considerations that are interesting to advocates of one 
thesis or another. Therefore, the discussion only consid-
ers what can be accomplished with the ideas that have 
been brought into the intelligible universe, whereas the 
discussion that I propose engages these considerations 
from a philosophical perspective.
For example, the interest in reducing the protec-
tion period clearly stems from an interest in releasing 
creative work from copyright protection or relaxing the 
rules surrounding its use on the Internet from within 
the copyright system6. However, the traditional justifi ca-
tion given for such initiatives is that the author must give 
back to society whatever he has obtained from it and 
that this can occur if copyright restrictions are relaxed.
The opportunity to access creative work using 
new technologies is currently a popular subject of dis-
cussion. Once again, the Internet comes to mind; there 
seems to be a suggestion that any sort of charge by an 
author represents an affront to the creative liberties 
of others.
Nevertheless, the point that I want to emphasize 
is that if the justifi cation for seeking an equilibrium is 
of an economic nature (as it always is, even if surrepti-
tiously), so that it is unreasonable to expect to resolve 
the issue by working from a philosophical perspective7. 
Nevertheless, I propose to undertake this analysis from 
a philosophical perspective, working on the basis of our 
contemporary understanding of the hermeneutics de-
veloped by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer.
If the justifi cation for assigning exclusive rights is 
to be given within the realm of philosophy (as proposed 
by the excessively libertarian contemporary copyright 
trends), one should use philosophical arguments; how-
ever, the results of such analysis cannot be used with an 
economic bias. This issue will be discussed in this article.
Once the background of the topic under consid-
eration has been considered, it must be remembered 
that even though art may appear unnecessary to the 
development of human beings, it is the very reason for 
many people’s existence and is therefore an end in itself. 
However, the autopoietic quality of art leads all individu-
als who are part of the social-cultural context to exhibit 
a protective potentiality as potential authors – the au-
thors of creations within the domain of the arts, culture 
and/or science.
The artist or creator translates the sensible into 
the intelligible, and this ability creates the issue to be re-
solved. Hermeneutics, as we shall see, allows this trans-
lation, which occurs through language8.
Artistic creation, in turn, takes place within lan-
guage. Therefore, language is the locus of artistic and 
creative expression.
As mentioned above, language is, above all, untran-
scendable (D’Agostini, 2003, p. 89). Language enables the 
development of creation. Language, be it literary, musical 
or pictorial, cannot simply be considered something that 
mediates the relationship between the creation and the 
creator. Language is not a simple tool; instead, it is part 
of the linguistic process.
The view in contemporary hermeneutics (start-
ing with Schleiermacher and Dilthey and becoming much 
more advanced in Heidegger [in hermeneutic philosophy] 
and later in Gadamer [in philosophical hermeneutics]) that 
language is a component of hermeneutics rather than a 
third element that exists between the subject and the 
object to be interpreted (but that is still a part of the 
hermeneutic circle) should also be observed by autho-
ralists so that we can understand from a philosophical 
perspective why artistic creations must be protected by 
copyright and why ideas cannot9.
Artistic creation is the result of hermeneutics, 
stemming from the creator’s own factual perceptions 
and from the artistic sensitivity that characterizes him 
and his worldview (Weltanschauung), which the senses 
facilitate. Such expression makes use of language, as al-
ready mentioned. However, understanding via language 
is not the only issue; other concepts must be adapted 
for hermeneutic theories to be considered in determin-
ing why artistic creation should be protected.
6 Here, I refer to both systems: copyright and droit d’auteur. 
7 Under the burden of artifi cial and shallow rhetorical statements such as information must be free.
8 I should clarify that this “passing” from the sensible to the intelligible does not represent a return to Platonic dualism. In fact, the phrase “the sensible” here refers to 
what is “shared a priori”, to “pre-understanding” or to “what is given” before the creation of a comprehensive framework”, whereas the intelligible is “the explication 
of that which is understood”. As Gadamer writes, interpretation is the explication of that which is understood.
9 The supposition that ideas are not subject to copyright protection is present in the two main systems, droit d’ auteur and copyright. This concept has become so 
universal that its meaning is not open to discussion, especially from a philosophical perspective. However, it is precisely for this reason that philosophical refl ections 
on the creative process and its foundations are pertinent. There are two important issues to be discussed. With regard to the concept of protecting the expression 
of ideas, the discussion centers on the object of protection or the creative subject. From a philosophical perspective and based on the concept of the hermeneutic 
circle, one should not draw a sharp distinction between the creation (work) and the creator (artist) because the two are intrinsically interconnected. Considering 
that artistic creation in my view constitutes interpretation and therefore that language is no longer a simple hermeneutic tool in the relationship between subject and 
object, we can consider the work to be a part of the subject and vice versa. Some authoralists have not realized that, for this reason, it is diffi cult to create an authoralist 
doctrine without disrupting the work (object)/author (subject) relationship. This division must not disrupt the philosophical notion that the creator and the creation 
are inextricably interconnected.
Drummond |  The creative circle: Why the linguistic turn is of philosophical interest in copyright law
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 5(1): 74-81                                       77
Thus, the established pattern, which suggests the 
need to balance copyright as providing exclusive rights 
with the right to access creative work or with crea-
tive liberty in general (as already observed outside the 
realm of philosophy), is misguided. The required balance 
between the use of (and previous access to) a work and 
its protection via exclusive rights does not take place 
on a solely commercial or legal level. Instead, it takes 
place on a philosophical level through the assertion that 
the individual and the fruits of his creative expression 
deserve protection based on the absolute freedom and 
existential potential of the work. Moreover, this equilib-
rium is sought in a creative environment that, although 
unrepeatable, may bear some similarity to previous 
ones. Because of this philosophical argument, copyright 
laws protect creation and condemn plagiarism.
However, for the same reasons, one cannot as-
sign excessive exclusivity to certain forms of creation 
(for example, to ideas) because (recalling the lapidary 
remark of Heidegger) if “language is the house of be-
ing”, then becoming the “master” of ideas would require 
ownership of all possible modes of expression (denying 
their “liberation” through exclusivity rights) and over 
language by limiting the creation of ideas in any creative 
form, thus enclosing being itself in a totality that does 
not belong to it. Even ontological difference would be 
ignored in preventing new artistic and cultural creations 
and forms of expression because ideas would be lim-
ited by the exclusive rights assigned to the subject who 
would thus exist in opposition to other (potential) crea-
tors. In this case, and because being is always the being 
of an entity, the creator would only be labeled as such 
if he could concretize the idea(s) in a particular form. 
The experience of achieving one’s creative potential and 
moving from the universe of a simple idea to that of cre-
ating a work of art is the ontological difference between 
a being (the one who conceives of an idea) and an entity 
(the one who concretizes the idea in a certain form). 
Thus, the ontological distinction would be that between 
being (who could potentially create something from an 
idea that was not concrete) and entity (as the creator-
concretizer of the idea/concept).
In this sense, therefore, as mentioned previously, 
exclusive rights cannot be assigned to mere ideas; they 
can only be assigned to the form that those ideas even-
tually assume. For precisely this reason, the expression 
of the artistic feelings of the creator cannot be limited; if 
they were, language would be limited, and one’s poten-
tial to become a (potentially) creative being would be 
philosophically demolished.
From the perspective of the creative being (and 
of being-in), no interpretation is repeatable.10 In addi-
tion, from a philosophical perspective, no one work will 
ever be the same as another, and each work is allow-
able as long as its origins are different and if the crea-
tion process is spontaneous and philosophically free. In 
this sense, protection will always and only be granted to 
form rather than to content.
Thus, from the perspective of the “creative be-
ing” it is as though there exists a “correct answer” for 
each feeling that manifests itself in a certain way, under 
certain conditions and with a certain outcome: artistic 
and cultural creation. Allowing the protection of simple 
ideas would make it possible to ignore the ontological 
difference between a being (the creator of an idea with 
the potential to realize it) and an entity (the creator 
himself or herself, who makes ideas into something con-
crete). This would blend the concepts of creations and 
ideas and of creative potential and actual creation.
Intellectual artistic creation is, therefore, in-
terpretation11. It is an understanding of the world and 
of the perspective inherent in pre-existing works as 
harnessed in the generation of the creative work and 
the meaning with which its creator imbued it12. It is a 
form of creation that emerges in the environment of 
the interpreter13 during the three fundamental stages 
10 It is worth remembering that hermeneutics is connected to the production of meaning/sense – Sinngebung.
11 The term “interpretation” here is meant to refer not to the creations that are the object of protection but rather to the philosophical concept of seeing the world.
12 As Gadamer suggests, “Understanding is not a mental transposition. The horizon of sense of understanding can neither really be limited by what the author originally 
had in mind, nor by the horizon of the recipient for whom the text was originally written” (Gadamer, 2008, p. 323).
13 Within the many libertarian or relativist currents intended to reduce the application of the principles of copyright (especially in the droit d’auteur system), the argu-
ments that lead to the reduction of applicable rights refer to inherent aspects of liberty. A Portuguese author, Vasco Pereira da Silva, notes both issues of an economic 
nature and issues related to liberty, and analyzes an important constitutional and fundamental bias that is frequently overlooked by authoralists. The author wishes to 
consider subjects who have no chance of being considered creators of the protected work. At one point, the author discusses this distinction by addressing the problem 
of identifying subjects associated with the constitutional protection of culture. Later, he argues that the right to cultural creation extends to other subjects in addition 
to the creator, who is the primary fi gure. The author notes that “[...] the scope of subjective protection should also be extended to all those who mediate between 
creation and bringing intellectual work to the public often replacing artists in the process of its publicization, promotion or even marketing [...]” (Silva, 2007, p. 95). 
He also names those subjects: among others, they include publishers, agents, producers and patrons. Citing Ipsen, he emphasizes that the mediators working with the 
artist (Mittler der Kunst), whose activity is a prerequisite for the completion of the work of art and its presentation to its audience, are also part of the process. With 
due reverence to the author, who in fact has addressed important issues associated with fundamental rights, I would argue that the fundamentals of his reasoning are 
incorrect: the author misidentifi es the source of artistic creation. The creator is the only individual who has the ability to create artistic creations from the world of 
sensible psychological abstractions and from an extra-sensorial, non-palatable universe. It is impossible for someone to consider himself an author if he has not actually 
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indicated by Heidegger (fore-having – Vorhabe; fore-sight 
– Vorsicht and fore-conception – Vorgriff14). This is what 
justifi es the view that the (exteriorized) interpretation 
of a specifi ed form can be granted exclusivity as long as 
that exclusivity does not prevent free creation and as 
long as the new creation is not offensive to the previ-
ous one or a simple copy. This concept takes shape in a 
philosophical environment and not in an economic or 
commercial one15.
Given the arguments presented, it must be under-
stood that the process of artistic creation exists in what 
is called the hermeneutic circle16. The concept of herme-
neutic circle indicates that, from a hermeneutic perspec-
tive, the part exists within the whole, and the whole should 
always be interpreted in conjunction with the part. This 
conceptualization serves as the basis for understanding 
texts in their entirety and in their different parts, but it can 
also serve as the basis for any other act of discursive or 
symbolic interpretation, which should always occur within 
its context and environment. For this reason, highlighting 
a text, a remark or a signal may at times condemn the 
highlighted part (and its author) to (mis)interpretation if it 
is taken outside the context of the whole.
The concept of hermeneutic circle was devel-
oped by Schleiermacher before it was advanced by 
Heidegger and Gadamer, although as a man of religion 
Schleiermacher considered hermeneutics insofar as it 
could aid in the interpretation of the scriptures. The 
German theologian said that “[...] as the whole is surely 
understood from the particular, the particular can also 
only be understood from the whole [...]”.
The philosopher identifi ed “[...] the hermeneutic prin-
ciple [...]”, which led him to develop the concept of 
the hermeneutic circle:
[...] is of such scope to this art, and so indisputable 
that even the fi rst operations cannot be established 
without its use, as a great deal of hermeneutic rules 
rest more or less upon it. Consider a word whose 
general linguistic value is known: the part of this lin-
guistic value that applies in the given excerpt and those 
which must be excluded will only be determined by 
other parts of the same sentence and, fi rst, by those it 
holds a closer organic relationship with, which means, 
therefore, that it is understood as part of the whole, 
an element of the group. And this applies not only to 
the choice among the so-called multiple meanings of 
a word, but also to all words susceptible of different 
gradations, to this same gradation and, in general, to 
the greater or lesser emphasis given to a word (Sch-
leiermacher, 2000, p. 47).
made possible the birth of its creation. Many arguments can be used to assign original authorship or ownership to any person other than the author, but this designa-
tion will always be a fi ction of the legal universe, whether used in determining a person’s rights or in considering the creations themselves. Even in the argument that 
creation results from human perceptions of the world and that therefore the creator is simply the conducting wire for something new in the arts, there should be no 
talk of assigning the role of creator to a third party rather than to the former individual, the one who made it possible to transform an artistic void – albeit one fi lled 
with the colors of previous creations – into something new and perceptible to the senses. Therefore, a patron cannot under any circumstances be compared to the 
creator of the work he has sponsored; however, he may be understood as having enabled the work that was created. I understand that the author argues that equal 
conditions are not the issue. I appreciate that the author defends his thesis (and the German authors quoted) as suggesting that cultural mediators might be viewed 
as holding the rights to creative work and not as creators per se. However, I also feel that even though they facilitate the work of creative artists, they do not deserve 
to be considered co-authors as a result. The most signifi cant issue is that this artifi cial expansion of authorship insistently equates creators with simple mediators. 
However, the philosophical line of reasoning discussed in this essay has already demonstrated the impossibility of this mode of thinking; the other participants in the 
process, as listed by Silva, are not part of the hermeneutic circle from which the work emerges. Claiming that they are free to circulate the work does not equate the 
members of this circle with artists; instead, it places them in different roles as mediators, facilitators or disseminators. Therefore, it would be reasonable to describe 
the other participants as holding the right to the free dissemination of art, but it would be exaggerative to describe these people as holding the right to free artistic 
creation rather than circulation.
14 I use Ernildo Stein’s translation to Heidegger existentials (the key principles articulated by Heidegger as existential structures of being-there), as he clarifi es them quite 
precisely: “The philosopher (Heidegger) articulates, with his existential analytics, a set of existentials that represent the structures of being-there. But these structures 
are not empirical, psychological qualities, for example. Neither do they represent merely formal and logical elements, concepts only. Therefore, the understanding with 
the elements of fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht) and fore-conception (Vorgriff) must be appreciated in its complexity” (Stein, 2007, p. 106).
15 Just as avoiding the problem of plagiarism requires a just and equitable relationship, so too does the use of work that several segments of society want not to be 
covered under the law.
16 On the hermeneutic circle, Lawn (2007, p. 76) says that “the notion of hermeneutic circle is the notion that the partial understanding of a portion of the text always 
changes the whole and the whole the parts”.On this note, I should add the following: being part of the whole makes us included in the hermeneutic circle but does not 
defi ne us because the part is nothing without the whole. Therefore, the concept of Dasein should be incorporated into our understanding of the hermeneutic circle 
and of the concept of being-there. Tradition (as in Gadamer), in turn, also strengthens the hermeneutic circle because we can only understand tradition if we realize that 
the part exists within the whole. Therefore, not only is the part an ingredient of the whole, but the whole is also an ingredient of the part, especially with reference to 
the temporal issue. According to Gadamer, “it is precisely what we have in common with the tradition we relate to that determines our anticipations and guides our 
understanding” (1996, p. 59). Tradition “is” in the hermeneutic circle. In addition to the understanding that the hermeneutic circle is the locus of hermeneutics and of 
the interpretative agreement performed by the subject – that the authentic Gadamerian tradition is present in the former and that the whole exists within in the part 
and vice versa, yielding the circularity of the Gadamerian and Heideggerian hermeneutics – there is another aspect that should not be overlooked: the fact that theory 
and practice will collide in the circularity of the hermeneutic environment, or as precisely communicated by Streck, “it is possible to say that Heidegger creates a new 
concept that describes an environment within which theoretical and practical knowledge are related through a circularity: the hermeneutic circle” (Streck, 2011, p. 155). 
In addition to the part and the whole and to theory and practice, the hermeneutic circle should also consider philosophy and Law as being part of the same universe. 
There is no Law without philosophy, and there is no philosophy without Law, especially after the invasion of philosophy by language, which occurred to the satisfaction 
of Law. However, it should be clear that one does not enter the hermeneutic circle; there is neither an entrance nor an exit door, as one is always in the hermeneutic 
circle because of one’s temporality and facticity.
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Schleiermacher obviously did not consider artis-
tic creation because that was not his concern, but be-
cause I recognize that artistic creation involves interpre-
tation in the philosophical sense, I think that the whole 
can be conceived of here as a series of other observ-
able complexities if we consider the existential senior-
ity of works and creators, the totality of pre-existing 
creations, the totality and complexity of all schools and 
styles of artistic creation and the complex totality of 
potential creation.17
In other words, the hermeneutic circle can be 
understood as the locus of creation, and this locus, as 
previously noted, is not a void but rather a world of 
Platonic ideals waiting for a “creator-conductor” to cap-
ture it and give life to its existential fullness.
This circular concept of philosophical complexity 
can (and should) be considered in the context of ar-
tistic creation because an artistic creation never exists 
out of context. The work is part of a whole. The whole 
is the environment from which the work emerges and 
which represents its totality. The same is also true of the 
whole composed of all the works created by an artist. 
Similarly, artistic creations that were created before the 
work under consideration are part of the whole. The 
work always relates to its creator, who, in turn, is also 
part of the whole. Because the “creative being” exists in 
a pre-existing world, he is infl uenced by his perceptions 
about previous artistic creations18. I have termed the 
hermeneutic circle in the context of artistic creation 
is the creative circle, and I have termed the inherent 
movement toward this locus creative circularity.
The hermeneutic circle, observed here as a crea-
tive circle, allows art19 (and the interpretations of the 
“creative being” to manifest itself through artistic crea-
tions infl uenced by their context. How much of this crea-
tion should be attributed to the author is not something 
that can be measured through copyright law without tak-
ing into account this new permutation of the hermeneutic 
circle. Even the origin of the work cannot be qualitatively 
measured by considering its context without recogniz-
ing the existence of the creative (hermeneutic) circle. 
The philosophical task of copyright law is to determine 
to what extent the creator can and should be individually 
protected for bringing an artistic creation into the world 
17 Slightly different from this essay but working in the same vein is the article by Mário Losano (2010, p. 35): “In the world of thought, innovations rarely cancel the old, 
but oftentimes they overlap it, so that the reaction to a movement of thought marks the return to the ideas against which the movement itself had reacted to” (p. 320). 
Even though Losano’s article refers to debates that are inherent in the broad structures of Law – in particular, regarding positivism and neo-Kantism – it is clear that the 
same logic stems from the creative process and that which is part of the creative circle, which, to a large extent, justifi es the existence of what I term cultural circle. The 
Cultural circle is another term that I have used in my thesis regarding the active participation of society, including the State, in circulating culture for the advancement of 
mankind. In this sense, it is clear that new artistic and cultural creations, as a consequence of the patterns discussed in this article, reinforce the circularity of creation.
18 Some theses that have gained popularity, especially in the United States of America, argue that the creative process should be relativized with regard to copyright 
protection. The theses are based on economic arguments, the concept of freedom of access to culture and the concept of creative freedom rather than on philosophi-
cal observations. Although I disagree with a signifi cant part of his thesis, the North-American author Lewis Hyde is an exception to this rule because, in his book The 
Gift, he develops a philosophical position and deviates from the simple economic or excessively libertarian arguments of other authors. In general, the author seeks to 
address the question of what can be considered artistic creation and to suggest that such creation should circulate socially as a gift. In a sense, what Hyde endorses is 
the idea that the artistic process works better when facilitated by the transmission of gifts and that art must therefore circulate. Thus, the author suggests that once an 
author is understood to be the creator of a work of art, he must allow its social circulation because he could only have created it after receiving it in the form of a gift 
from another author who, in turn, was previously fueled by some other creation. This vicious-virtuous circle is suggested to be crucial in stimulating artistic creation 
and ensuring the possibility of new creations. Indeed, the author argues that a new creative process is only possible using this approach. “If the gift is not consummated, 
the creative spirit is consumed” (Hyde, 2011, p. 230). The author argues that only through the creative process conceived as a process of gift-giving can there be new 
future creation, suggesting that all works are simultaneously both original and derived. This supposition is true from a philosophical perspective because all creations 
originate from some previous perception and have the potential to feed future creations. In this area, we agree. Hyde claims, “Gifting creates a space through which 
a new energy fl ows. The alternative is petrifi cation, blocking the ability to create”, “it is as if life were prevented from fl owing” (Hyde, 2011, p. 231). Like the entire 
discussion presented here, Hyde’s thesis arises to some extent from the early debates surrounding copyright and suggests that a signifi cant portion of what is created 
results from creation by previous subjects, thereby not justifying the exclusive protection of copyright. This position infl uences various copyright doctrines that aim to 
balance the relationship between exclusive protection (the broadest form of protection for intellectual property) and free use by society, as is the case of the public 
domain and copyright limitations. However, this libertarian position, also observed in authors such as Lawrence Lessig and in the creative commons doctrine, appears 
to ignore the fact that creation may occur because of motivations other than “creation by creation” (in others words, creation for the sake of creation). If Hyde believes 
that “by accepting what is given to him, the artist feels compelled to create a work and to offer it to the public”, may we suggest that there are artists who are givers 
by nature and others who are not? Furthermore, will the non-giver necessarily be a “bad creator”? Will the work of the latter be a “bad creation” in the two most 
obvious meanings that fi t the case at hand? This logic seems to lead to a division between more and less “generous” artists and begs the question of whether some 
works circulate more than others because they are the objects of what the author calls gifting. Will these “other” works of art not be of the same level of quality? 
Is this not the same as wanting to assign a human character and characteristics to a created object (work)? Is there such a thing as a fundamentally selfi sh creation? 
These questions all appear to arise from the author’s argument, but I think that there are no answers to these questions. Even if the “gift must be kept in motion”, this 
does not mean that a creation that is not donated will necessarily not infl uence other creations or will not be part of the virtuous circle of creative infl uence, just as 
an artist who in his private life behaves like a scoundrel may not fail to infl uence other people. As much as it is recognized that circulation will be more carefree and 
uncommitted, this is not a reality that can be extended to each and every artistic creation. In this sense, it appears that Hyde was not concerned with the analysis of 
the subjective-objective content of the emergence of a work of art, in light of the hermeneutic circle. Considering that the book The Gift was written in the 1970s and 
1980s, it was groundbreaking when compared with recent authors who claim to be libertarian as a result of new trends in copyright analysis, which have been exces-
sively ideologized in my opinion, especially after the emergence of the creative commons. In addition to Lewis Hyde (Hyde, 2011) and the works of Lawrence Lessig in 
general, other texts with an excessively liberal bias, in my view, but which deserve some attention because of the studies conducted (or theses presented) are Copyrights 
and copywrongs. The rise of intellectual property and how it threatens creativity by Siva Vaidhyanathan (2007) and The soul of creativity. Forging a moral rights law for the United 
States by Roberta Rosenthal Wall (2009).
19 The knowledge and sensitive perception of the creator are also relevant.
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– one that is perceptible via the senses. In this sense, 
I recognize that concretized creation in the creative circle 
requires the return to a place of origin given the possi-
bility of cultural circularity. However, this idea cannot be 
examined from an economic or legal perspective without 
considering the philosophical concept of the moment and 
locus of creation. All of this is justifi ed from a philosophical 
perspective rather than an economic or legal one.
Another important issue is that the senses can 
be activated differently depending on the artistic con-
cept and work type. Thus, one cannot say that a work 
is protected because it takes a particular form – e.g., 
that sound can be protected but that literature cannot, 
because its abstraction does not allow us to determine 
when it fi rst existed as a creation. Thus, the creative cir-
cle will be different for each mode of artistic expression. 
In addition, given that the creator may create in differ-
ent ways, the moment at which the form of creation is 
chosen is also a moment of creation. All of this takes 
place in the creative circle; considering that the circle 
is composed of a whole of infi nite possibilities, the vari-
ous modes of artistic expression are enhanced by each 
potential creative subject20.
In the context of the creative circle, another ques-
tion that can be posited is whether the work precedes 
the artist21 – or, to put it differently, whether the artist 
comes before the work or whether the work already “is” 
(in the world). The work may not (yet) be a creation but 
it is potentially in the world. The work is either in the 
artist or “part of him”, or, as I said, just potentially in the 
world. Thus, from a philosophical perspective, it does not 
make much sense to say that a work only exists because 
there is an artist; indeed, the work may come into being 
through another artist. Furthermore, as there will always 
be another artist, the work always is, although it may not 
have been created yet. The creation in question would not 
come into being only if there were no potential inherent 
in it: i.e., if there were no subject, it would attract no dis-
cussion, not even that proposed here. In essence, the po-
tential for creation is inherent in each and every subject, 
whether it is labeled as being able to be created or not. In 
this sense, one might say that the work, if it does not ex-
ist (just potentially), is nihilated; thus, every work already 
exists (potentially, but in a nihilated form). In this sense, 
and from this philosophical perspective, every work al-
ready exists and therefore does not come from an artist; 
instead, it comes from an artist and from itself in its locus, 
and it is therefore part of the creative circle. At the same 
time, this concept justifi es the protection of the creator 
who concretized the potentiality of the work in its pre-
existing formHowever, an artistic creation exists as a part 
within the whole that is the productive career of the art-
ist. Referring once again to the concept of hermeneutic 
circle, I believe that the part of the creative circle com-
posed of the human senses should demonstrate that the 
whole cannot be protected by exclusivity; if it were, no 
disparate parts could emerge. Conversely, the protection 
of the whole is not reasonable because one cannot pro-
tect everything; vague concepts such as ideas are not eli-
gible for protection. The notion of hermeneutic circle as 
presented in the works of Schleiermacher, Gadamer and 
Heidegger, in the adapted form I term the creative circle, 
can be interpreted in the light of copyright law. We must 
always facilitate the human creative potential as much as 
possible, but the creator (hermeneutician) should be able 
to claim whatever part of the whole he brought to frui-
tion using his interpretative ability. This concretized part 
of the whole should be subject to copyright protection 
and should therefore be concretized (for legal purposes) 
as an intelligible and protectable work.
In short, there are two important elements of 
this concept. First, all artistic creations exist in a poten-
tial, communicative-interpretative, hermeneutic/creative 
meta-circle. The creative universe as a whole cannot be 
protected, but part of it can be (i.e., the set of works 
created), even if the latter is part of the overall creative 
circle. Second, this environment makes protection pos-
sible because of the rights associated with acts of the 
artistic interpretation performed by the creative/herme-
neutic subject; this is the protectable work. To create, this 
creative subject (creative-being) must have entered the 
hermeneutic circle, which in this case I term creative circle.
The leap into the creative circle (just as into the 
hermeneutic circle) can take place through a more or 
less original creation in the sense of known seniority 
(of creation)22. Because there is no “entrance door” 
20 Therefore, the conception and application of the exclusivity of ideas, but in such a way that it does not allow for the free creative development by others who do not 
own exclusivity, would create a potential for the exclusive appropriation of language to occur under various art forms. This invasion of the borders of the potentialities 
of any expression might lead, in the end, to such a simplifi cation that anyone observing that an ideal expression was compatible with various forms would be appropriat-
ing artistic language in the most effective way. To be clear, anyone who intended to create a musical composition on betrayal could be the holder of this exclusivity in 
the musical fi eld and, considering the potentiality and integration between forms of creation, any work of any kind that had this simple ideological mention would be 
enslaved in the protection of the non-concretizing idealizer.
21 According to Heidegger, “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. Likewise, neither of the two also car-
ries the other alone. Artist and work are-in-themselves and in their mutual reference through a third, which is the fi rst, i.e., through that from where artist and work 
have their name, through art” (2010, p. 25).
22 Because most likely a part of a creation has been pre-created/emerged (if one wants to use this concept of emergence – by another entity, as can be understood).
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into the hermeneutic circle, one cannot actually deter-
mine whether the initiator of a creation has produced a 
“most internal” creation because he cannot be defi ned 
as the (most) original creator. From a hermeneutic per-
spective, no fundamental original creator exists; rather, 
being-there exists in the environment of creation – the 
interpretation of the world is a reality – and, in this case, 
its Weltanschauung leads to another creation.
If “the being is in that which the thing is”, in fact, 
in the present at hand (Vorhandenheit), then this being, the 
creator, develops interpretations or ideas through the 
creation process and creates things through interpreta-
tion. The best creator will be the best interpreter – the 
entity of his being (artist-author), the potential creator.23
What copyright theory should aim to do, when 
properly viewed in light of the invasion of philosophy by 
linguistics, Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics and 
Heideggerian hermeneutic philosophy, is protect the act 
of creation that takes place through the hermeneutic 
process of understanding the circumstances observed 
by the author-creator in a wide universe, which is con-
ducted via hermeneutics in the process of artistic crea-
tion. The protection of potentiality (represented by the 
whole) is impossible; however, the protection of a part 
is possible (where the part refers to a concretized and 
exteriorized work) because the construction of the 
latter took place concretely, creating a work of art in 
hermeneutic and not merely potential terms. This also 
explains the notion that the hermeneutic circle exists in 
a context in which pre-judgments and pre-conceptions 
are understood from the creator perspective as part of 
the subjectivity that, in turn, also helps to compose the 
hermeneutic circle from where the work emerges as an 
artistic creation.
Given this overview, and having analyzed the 
process of artistic creation as the hermeneutics of what 
already exists in the world, I believe that a subject who 
is capable of producing artistic work deserves remu-
neration or compensation even though the whole can-
not be protected via exclusive rights because of the risk 
(given a radical interpretation) of restricting language.
The task of copyright is to analyze to what de-
gree such protection should be exclusive at the expense 
of potential new artistic work. The aim is to honor the 
value of subjective artistic work but also to avoid pre-
venting the development of new work.
Part of the material discussed in this essay has 
already been addressed by authoralists, but it has never 
been considered in the hermeneutic context. Using this 
perspective, I have aimed to show that economic issues 
and those of a different nature – especially legal issues 
– are supported by concepts from hermeneutics, which 
I would argue is the most fair and effective way to search 
for the philosophical truth. Acknowledging the linguistic 
turn as part of the legal world and not as a mere tool 
should make it possible to achieve the legal truth, even 
in the attempt to justify assigning exclusive protection 
to intellectual creations.
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